State of Utah, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. James Christopher McCallie, Defendan Tjresponden T. by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School 
BYU Law Digital Commons 
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) 
2017 
State of Utah, Plaintiff/Petitioner, v. James Christopher McCallie, 
Defendan Tjresponden T. 
Utah Supreme Court 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. 
Recommended Citation 
Supplemental Submission, State of Utah v McCallie, No. 20160500 (Utah Supreme Court, 2017). 
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3358 
This Supplemental Submission is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (2000– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law 
Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with 
questions or feedback. 
,· 
INTHE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
SCOTT RICHARD STEW ART, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appellate Court No. 20160484-SC 
This is Appellee/Defendant, Mr. Stewart's response to the State of 
Utah's appeal brief, filed in support of its interlocutory appeal from an 
order excluding evidence by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, District Court Case No. J 31911542. 
HONORABLE RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
John J. Nielsen (#11736) 
Assistant Solicitor General 
Sean D. Reyes (#7969) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
Jacob S. Taylor 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for the State o Utah 
Appellant/Plaintiff 
J. Morgan Philpot (#11855) 
1063 East Alpine, Dr. 
Alpine, UT 84004 
Telephone: (801) 891-4499 
Email: morgan@jmphilpot.com 
Counsel for Scott R. Stewart 
Appellee / Defendant (Not in custody) 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAY 2 2 2017 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................................................................................... 2 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND ST AND ARDS OF REVIEW ................................. 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 4 
I. An Episode of Unlawful Activity Under Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act, Must 
Separately Constitute An Offense Under the Law .............................................................. 5 
II. An Otherwise Time-Barred Offense, Is No Offense Under the Law ................................. 8 
A. Charged or Uncharged, There is Still No Offense .................................................................. 9 
B. State v. Crank ........................................................................................................................ 10 
C. State v. McGrath ................................................................................................................... 12 
D. State v. Ka)1 ............................................................................................................................ 13 
III. There is No Merit to the State's Other Arguments ............................................................... 16 
A. The Nature of Limitations Statutes ........................................................................................ 16 
B. The Application of Federal RICO Cases ............................................................................... 18 
C. The Supposed Meaninglessness Implied by the Court's Decision ........................................ 20 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 21 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) .......................................................... 7 
Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, 323 P.3d 998 ................................................................. 10 
Horton v. Goldmine r's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989) ............................... 17 
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ............................................... 14, 17 
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016) ........................................ 19 
Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy, 890 P.2d IO 17 (Utah 1995) .................................. 7, 18 
Salt Lake Cty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45,234 P.3d l 105 .................................. 10 
Spinelli, K., S.A. v. /mas G., A.I.A., & Assocs., 602 F. Supp. 372,377 (D. Md. 1985) .... 18 
State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (l 943) ................................................... passim 
State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah App. 1997) ................................................. 18 
State v. Jackson, 201 I UT App 318,263 P.3d 540 ........................................................... l l 
State v. Kay, 20 I 5 UT 43, 349 P.3d 690 (2015) ......................................................... passim 
State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 635 (Utah 1988) ..................................................... passim 
State v. Moreno, 9 IO P.2d 1245 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ................................................. 3, 17 
United States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1992) ................................................... l 1 
United States v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318, 1329 (3d Cir. l 993) .......................................... 19 
Waters v. United States, 328 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. I 964) ................................................... 11 
Statutes & Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 ................................................................................ 2, 4, 5, 9 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-10-1602 ................................................................................... passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3- l 02(3)(b) .................................................................................... 2 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(f)( 1) ............................................................ 22 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 42 ..................................................................... .iii 
111 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review, then certified the appeal to this 
Court, which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(b). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The State of Utah details only one issue in its appeal. See Appellant's 
Brief, at 3. Namely, "Did the trial court err by excluding evidence of predicate acts that 
were part of the alleged pattern of unlawful activity?" Id. However, this general 
question, leaves open too much room. As explained below, it does not get directly to the 
legal issue that the Court must decide here. A more accurate and direct explanation of the 
issue presented is, "Can the allegation of an otherwise time-barred offense, be used by the 
Government in a criminal prosecution, to satisfy the definition of "unlawful activity" at 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602( 4 )?" The significance of this question is plain, under 
U .C.A. § 76-10-1602(2) the government must prove "at least three episodes of unlawful 
activity" in order to establish a "pattern" of conduct criminalized by § 76-10-1603 et seq. 
If the answer to the above question is no, then the district court was well within its 
authority and discretion to exclude the evidence at issue, as it explained, one statute of 
limitations grounds, because it was irrelevant and prejudicial under Rules 401, 402 and 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. On the other hand, if the answer to the above 
question is yes, then the district court was in error on the grounds cited, and should 
reconsider the other alternative grounds advocated by Mr. Stewart. Narrowing the 
specific question is important, because, 1) it focuses on the core legal determination 
2 
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requested of this Court, and 2) respectfully, it renders the large majority of the State's 
argument on appeal, irrelevant. 
2. Further, while the issue presented deals directly with the exclusion of 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, the legal standard of review cited by the State applies 
to the "applicability of a statute of limitations" as a legal question, and that is "reviewed 
for correctness." Id. But, as demonstrated below, there is no legal dispute in this case 
about the relevant period of limitations, nor the correctness of the statute of limitations as 
applied to the relevant "predicate" acts at issue, the otherwise time-barred offenses 
outlined in the State's proposed jury instruction. Id. at 15. Both parties and the district 
court agree that the alleged "offenses" at issue here, pertaining to the Nichols, Grandy, 
Conner, Mills, Goff, Wilkins, Rawlins, Stanger, Crosby-Bums, Manzanares, and 
Robinson are individually time-barred. However, this Court is being asked to review a 
different legal question, as derived from the application of these facts, and as such, the 
appropriate legal standard involves two considerations. First, "[t]he factual findings 
underlying a trial court's decision" to exclude or suppress evidence is "reviewed under 
the deferential clearly-erroneous standard" and then secondarily, "the legal conclusions" 
of the trial court involved in that exclusion, "are reviewed for correctness, with a measure 
of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." State 
v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
3 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The one question presented by the instant appeal is not nearly as complicated, nor 
tortured, as the State's appeal might make it seem. There is no order, nor any dispute 
presented that interprets or enforces the relevant statute of limitations. The State presents 
no argument - directly or by implication - challenging the district court's conclusion that 
"the predicate acts relied on by the State regarding Nichols, Grandy, Conner, Mills, Goff, 
Wilkins, Rawlins, Stanger, and Crosby-Bums are outside the statute of limitations" R892. 
Similarly, despite the lengthy treatment of this issue by the State, there is no order, nor 
any dispute, regarding whether the four separate criminal acts defined by Utah's Pattern 
of Unlawful Activity Act at § 76-10-1603 et seq., are "continuing offenses" under the 
law. Finally, there is no dispute, nor any order of the district court that even questions 
whether the one Pattern of Unlawful count included in the Amended Information at issue 
in this case, is by itself, barred by the relevant statute of limitations. It is not. 
While these topics are tangentially related to the issues at hand, and while the 
State's brief is largely consumed with a discussion of these issues, there is no dispute 
about them and most of the discussion is, respectfully, irrelevant. The actual question 
raised by the State's appeal has to do with the meaning and application of the statutory 
phrase "Unlawful Activity" at § 76-10-1602( 4 ), and it is on this issue that Mr. Stewart's 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
An Episode of Unlawful Activity Under Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Act, Must Separately Constitute An Offense Under the Law. 
There are four distinct crimes defined by Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act 
("UPUA"), and these are defined at§ 76-10-1603. An undisputed essential element of 
each of the four crimes requires the State to allege and prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that "a pattern of unlawful activity" exists. Id. But, while this is a necessary element, it is 
not sufficient proof for the State to end there. Separately, and in addition, the statute 
requires the State to secondarily prove that "any person" charged under this statute, has 
also committed any one of four specific acts; being generally, 1) having "received" or 
"derived" "any proceeds" from the pattern of unlawful activity1; 2) having "acquire[ d]" 
or "maintaine[ d]" "any interest in or control of any enterprise" through a pattern of 
unlawful activity; 3) having been ''employed by or associated" with "any enterprise" to 
have "conduct[ ed] or particiate[ d]" in that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of 
unlawful activity; or 4) to have "conspire[d] to violate" any of the above three provisions. 
Thus, the one common legal factor, no matter how the statute is analyzed or applied, and 
no matter which of the four crimes specified is charged, the crime itself - will always 
require proof that a "pattern of unlawful activity" has been alleged and proven. 
For the reasons illustrated above, when applying the UPUA, a court's first and 
central determination, and the only specific question raised by this appeal, has to do with 
1 Not at issue in this appeal, the statue also requires that the State allege and prove that the person 
charged with receiving or deriving such proceeds, also participated in the pattern of unlawful 
activity "as a principal" and then with those proceeds, "invest[ ed] directly or indirectly" in the 
"acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise." § 1603( I). 
5 
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the definition of what constitutes a "pattern of unlawful activity" under the statute. The 
phrase "pattern of unlawful activity" is defined by the UPUA at § 76-10-1602(2). 
The definition is rather involved, but the beginning point is the use of the word 
"pattern", and under the UPUA, a "pattern" of unlawful activity exists when the person 
charged has "engag[ ed] in conduct which constitutes the commission of at least three 
episodes of unlawful activity" Id. With the term "pattern" defined as "three episodes", 
the definition goes on to define, modify and amend the characteristics that must also exist 
- in order for any particular "episode" to qualify as part of the pattern. But, for the 
purposes at issue here - the refinements of the term "episode" are all secondary concerns. 
The next and most important determination in applying the statute, and the most relevant 
determination here, has to do with how conduct qualifies as "unlawful activity" and 
therefore, the basis for one of the three episodes required to establish a pattern. 
Or, to put it more simply, the central inquiry at this point, is how the UPUA 
defines a single episode of "unlawful activity" as the basic starting point, or building 
block of any charge under the UPUA. Answering this question requires careful attention 
to detail, especially because of the repeated and interrelated use of the words "act", 
"activity", "unlawful" throughout the UPUA. As the State admits, Appellant's Br. at 12, 
with any question of statutory interpretation, this Court's primary goal "is to effectuate 
the intent of the Legislature ... [ and] [t]he best evidence of the Legislature's intent is the 
statute's plain language." State v. Kay, 2015 UT 43, <JI 15, 349 P.3d 690, 693, reh'g denied 
(May 21, 2015). Here, any particular episode of "unlawful activity", (i.e. any "predicate 
offense") under the UPUA, is limited to a very specific statutory construction provided 
6 
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by the Utah Legislature. In fact, the term "unlawful activity", like the phrases referenced 
above, has been expressly defined in the UPUA statute. 
"Unlawful activity" means "to directly engage in conduct ... which would 
constitute any offense described by the following crimes or categories of crimes, or to 
attempt or conspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of those offenses, 
regardless of whether the act is in fact charged or indicted by any authority" § 76-10-
1602. (Emphasis added.) The definition goes on to list a broad range of "crimes" and 
"categories of crimes" that fall within the scope of the term "unlawful activity" and what 
conduct can constitute an episode of the same. 
This is the critical portion of the definition, the statute, and the present appeal. 
While Mr. Stewart agrees with the State that the definition includes "a long list of 
predicate offenses - 90 of them - a number of which encompass multiple crimes", 
Appellant's Br. at 16, under the plain language of the statute, there is no "unlawful 
activity" and therefore no "episode" of unlawful activity, if the person charged under the 
UPUA is accused of alleged activity that does not constitute any of the listed offenses, or 
which could not constitute "any" of those offenses. 
Moreover, "[u]nambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to 
contradict its plain meaning." Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989) (per 
curiam). The law requires that, "when reviewing a statute" the Court must "assume[ ] that 
each term in the statute was used advisedly" and "thus the statutory words are read 
literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Salt Lake Child 
& Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995). And, this 
7 
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is the crux of this appeal. The key dispute that was litigated before the district court, and 
the key question asked here - has to do with the specific language and the precise terms 
used in the UPUA, that plainly limits the meaning of the term "unlawful activity" to: 
"conduct ... which would constitute any offense described by the [statutory list of 
qualifying] crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or conspire to engage in an act 
which would constitute any of those offenses."§ 76-10-1602(4). Where the State's 
appeal fails - is on this point, squarely. 
In fact, in its analysis, the State's treatment of the "plain meaning" of the UPUA 
on this definition, actually omits all of the key language. See Appellant's Br. at 13.2 This 
is not to attribute any ill motive, just to respectfully, yet poignantly illustrate State 
blindness to the importance of the one critical issue upon which the district court heard 
over an hour of oral argument, and upon which the appealed order directly relied. 
II. An Otherwise Time-Barred Offense, Is No Offense Under the Law. 
The district court order currently on appeal prevents the government from using 
evidence of otherwise time-barred offenses as evidence to prove a pattern of unlawful 
activity. Nowhere, before the district court or on appeal, does the government argue that 
it sought the introduce the evidence at issue, as proof relating to any other count, nor for 
any other purpose. Its sole purpose relates to proving alleged episodes of "unlawful 
activity" as part of the Pattern of Unlawful Activity charge. Thus, on appeal, the 
2 The State's brief includes the definition of the tern "Unlawful activity" from the UPUA statute, 
but in place of the relevant language, uses the phrase "among other things" to describe the 
statute's additional limits on the term. The point here is that these "other things" are the "things" 
upon which the present legal question turns, in support of Mr. Stewart and the district court. 
8 
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propriety and validity of the district court's order excluding this evidence turns entirely3 
on the answer to the question presented - can an otherwise time-barred offense4 
constitute proof of "unlawful activity" under the UPUA. 
A. Charged or Uncharged, There is Still No Offense. 
The State repeatedly emphasizes that the UPUA includes within its definition a 
broad scope of conduct, "whether the act is in fact charged or indicted" as a separate 
offense. Appellant's Br. at 13. But, there is no quarrel on this point, neither was there 
before the district court. The legal issues here is not whether the conduct was charged or 
uncharged, indicted or unindicted, that detail is of no matter. The legal issue raised 
before the district court, as now re-raised here, is that previously dismissed time-barred 
claims are not, and cannot be, "unlawful activity" under the plain language of the 
UPUA, because such conduct only qualifies as "unlawful activity" if it "would 
constitute" a relevant offense at the time at the time a defendant is charged with one of 
the four violations outlined at § 76-10-1603, and because of the expired statute of 
limitations period here, such conduct could not and did not, constitute an such offense. 
Not only does the government fail to directly address this point on appeal, it 
provides no legal authority to support the position that conduct which clearly falls outside 
the relevant statute of limitations period could or would somehow "constitute" any 
3 The practical irrelevance of the argument raised by the State, regarding the relationship ( or the 
claimed lack thereof) between the statute of limitations and the rules of evidence pertaining to 
admissibility, is addressed separately below. 
4 There is no dispute that the alleged unlawful activity (predicate episodes) at issue are 
"previously dismissed claims", independently time-barred by the statute of limitations. R891-92. 
9 
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"offense." In fact, there is direct authority in Utah law, that such conduct does not, and 
cannot constitute "any" offense under the law. 5 
B. State v. Crank 
In State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) this court was presented 
with a situation where the statute of limitations had run on the charge of manslaughter, 
but not on charges of murder in the first and second degrees, and a related challenge to an 
instructions submitted to the jury on these charges. The issue submitted required the 
court to explain the contours and effect of criminal statutes of limitation. In declaring the 
law on this point, the court explained, in relevant part: 
The state is not permitted to prosecute a man, put him on, and to the 
expense of, his defense, nor have a verdict adjudging one a felon when the 
statute of limitations has run. The statute runs against the filing of such 
complaint or information; against the attempt to prosecute. It says in effect, 
that as far as such offense is concerned, a man may not in law be 
considered as having committed it; he may not, within the spirit of the 
law be properly accused thereof or charged therewith. 
Id. at 193-94 (Emphasis added.) This principle in the law has not been disturbed since 
Crank. When the statute of limitations would otherwise bar a conviction on a particular 
offense, the additional legal consequence ensures and requires still more, specifically, 
that "a man may not ... be considered as having committed it" and "he may not ... be 
properly accused" let alone charged. While Crank has been scrutinized on the topic of 
5 Further, and very respectfully, the question is not whether previously dismissed time-barred 
charges should constitute an offense going forward, but whether such conduct could constitute an 
offense at time he was charged. See e.g. Salt Lake Cty. v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45, 'II 41, 
234 P.3d 1105, 1113; Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63, 'II 17, 323 P.3d 998, 1003. 
10 
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whether a statute of limitations defense is a subject matter jurisdictional issue6 or an 
affirmative defense that can be waived, it has not been overturned, and the holding cited 
above, has been re-affirmed. Further, if a statute of limitations is an "affirmative 
defense" then in this case, it was raised, in the sense that Mr. Stewart affirmatively raised 
the issue, and because the alleged conduct is time-barred by the statute of limitations, he 
has made a successful pre-emptive defense against the allegation that such conduct 
"could" constitute an offense in this case. 
The same conclusion promulgated so clearly by Crank, also remains at the core of 
the Tenth Circuit's application of the same principle. Recognizing that many courts have 
concluded that a criminal statute of limitations does not limit the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit has made it a point to continually point out that there is, 
nevertheless, no dispute that a statute of limitations does limit the executive branches 
authority to bring charges. 
If the statute of limitations is to have any meaning in the administration of 
criminal justice, [it] must be held ... to operate as a jurisdictional limitation 
upon the power to prosecute and punish ... It is plainly a limitation upon the 
power to prosecute or to punish. Allowing the government to do so ... would 
be to change the statute of limitations from a law into a mere suggestion. 
United States v. Cooper, 956 F.2d 960, 962 (10th Cir. 1992) citing Waters v. United 
States, 328 F.2d 739, 743 (10th Cir. 1964) ("Unlike the statute of limitations in civil 
6 See e.g. State v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 318,263 P.3d 540,547 (Holding as a "matter of first 
impression" that a statute of limitations defense "can be waived" and is not in that sense 
"jurisdictional" but still acknowledging that it is an "affirmative defense" and a "bar to 
prosecution" if timely raised.); James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 573 (Utah Ct. App. 
l 998)(Specifically acknowledging the holding in Crank, as cited herein, and further recognizing 
that, "[s]tatutes of limitations are invoked to protect the rights of the defendant" and while they 
do not limit the court's jurisdiction, they provide an "affirmative defense" and if timely invoked, 
"are a bar to prosecution.") 
11 
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cases, it is not a mere limitation upon the remedy, but a limitation upon the power of the 
sovereign to act against the accused.) 
C. State v. McGrath 
The relevance of State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631, 635 (Utah 1988) was argued 
before the district court, and is raised by the State in its appeal. See Appellant's Br. at 13, 
15 and 18. McGrath does not support the State's position. While it is true, that McGrath 
makes clear that predicate acts of racketeering conduct "do not need to be charged or 
indicted", id., at 636, as pointed out above, that is rather irrelevant here. But, McGrath 
does provide support to Mr. Stewart's position and that taken by the district court. In 
McGrath this court was confronted with several issues related to Utah's prior 
racketeering statute, including a challenge by the defendant in that case that "the State 
failed to convict him on at least two of the eight indictments which charged him with 
distribution of a controlled substance" and therefore, according to that defendant, it 
"failed to prove that he engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 634. That is 
the context from which the State derives its quote regarding its uncontested point that 
predicate acts of racketeering can be either charged or uncharged. But, and this is 
significant, while McGrath does not deal with challenges to predicate acts based upon the 
relevant statute of limitations - as does this case with Mr. Stewart, it squarely 
acknowledges the valid legal principle that predicate acts - whether they are charged or 
uncharged - are nevertheless subject to legal scrutiny, on the grounds of legal validity. 
Simply, in McGrath, this court distinguished federal cases cited by the defendant there, 
by pointing out that unlike those cases, in his case (McGrath's), "none of the predicate 
12 
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acts which support the racketeering charge have been invalidated." McGrath, 749 P.2d at 
635. While subtle, the point is important. A predicate act, that is not legally valid or (in 
the words of this court), that has been "invalidated" by a subsequent legal challenge 
raised by the defendant, legitimately changes the analysis as to its effect in supporting a 
racketeering charge. 
D. State v. Kay 
The State's treatment of State v. Kay 2015 UT 43, 349 P.3d 690, reh'g denied 
(May 21, 2015), addresses virtually every possible angle of the case, as it applies to a 
statute of limitations argument, except for the most relevant issue here. To begin with, 
Mr. Stewart agrees that Kay "did not interpret the UPUA", Appellant's Br. at 22, and that 
"the essence" of Kay was that "neither the communications fraud statue" nor the 
"securities fraud statute" as they were then written, constituted continuing offenses. Id. at 
24. But, here again, the State slips into the irrelevant. There is no dispute that a Pattern 
of Unlawful Activity charge, is by its nature, a charge involving a continuing "pattern" 
and that for its statute of limitations purposes, on a UPUA charge - itself, the limitations 
period does not begin to run until the last act in the relevant series of acts is completed. 
But, this misses the question as to the effect the statute of limitations has on invalidating 
the alleged predicate offenses as time-barred and therefore preventing the same from 
being "unlawful activity" under the statute. Neither Mr. Stewart nor the district court 
took issue with the limitations period as applied to the UPUA charge itself, nor has the 
count been dismissed on limitations grounds. 
13 
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The issue, as explained above, is a legal determination - as to what constitutes 
"unlawful activity" under the UPUA. Here, Kay is definitively instructive. And while it 
did not interpret the statute, as outlined above, no interpretation is needed because the 
meaning of the terms are plain, and the consequence of the statue of limitations on 
whether charged or uncharged activity can legally "constitute" an offense, is established 
law in Utah, under Crank, Jackson, Ga/etka, and by implication, McGrath. Like the 
district court's reliance, Mr. Stewart's argument is that Kay clarifies the consequence of 
invalid predicate acts in a UPU A charge and is an example affirming this position, and 
further clarifying the position advanced here. 
First, in Kay, this Court explained, "because the pattern of unlawful activity 
charge" in that case, "was predicated on the four charges of communication fraud, the 
district court correctly dismissed all of the charges in Kay/." Kay, 349 P.3d at 695. The 
State argues that this doesn't affect the case against Mr. Stewart, because "unlike in Kay, 
the pattern count here alleges at least one timely predicate act." Appellant's Br. at 2. But, 
there is a subtle contradiction in the State's position. 
The State also argues that the Kay decision does not interpret the UPU A statute. 
Thus, the conclusions reached in Kay, are not new, but an example of a clear application 
of the law. Thus, when Kay doesn't even endeavor to explain why the predicate offenses 
are invalidated by being time-barred, it is unmistakable that no explanation was 
necessary. The contradiction in the State's position is most easily seen by asking this 
question. Why would the dismissal of the time-barred, communication fraud charges 
mean that the district court correctly dismissed the UPUA count? Kay answers, because 
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the UPUA count was "predicated" upon these time-barred charges. But, the State argues 
that this is because all counts were "all" time-barred, and since in Mr. Stewart's case, at 
least "one" predicate episode is not time-barred, the circumstances are different. But, that 
is reading more into Kay than is there, and it is ignoring both the definitional element of 
the statute (one predicate act is defined the same as any other) and the fact that Kay 
implicitly requires the conclusions that statute of limitations analysis on the "predicate" 
offenses is an appropriate manner of legal scrutiny, going to their "validity" ( e.g. 
McGrath) of the predicate, meaning time-barred conduct is not legally able to qualify as 
"unlawful activity" under the UPU A statue because they cannot constitute an offense. 
Stated in its most simple form, Kay clearly demonstrates that the State's fundamental 
theory on appeal is manifestly incorrect, i.e. "the statute of limitations for predicate acts 
had 'no effect' on their admissibility to prove pattern," Appellant's Br. at 3, and that 
"regardless of the statute of limitations for the older offenses, they are properly within the 
pattern statute." Id., at 18. 
Second, if the State's theory is wrong, there is no merit to its individual 
arguments. The logical and unmistakable consequence of the government's theory is that 
no statute of limitations analysis can invalidate any predicate offense under the UPUA. 
But, there is no escaping the logical and unmistakable consequence of Kay, that a 
predicate offense invalidated by the statute of limitations, does not constitute an offense. 
The State tries to carve out of these mutually exclusive views with an exception that says, 
in effect, if one predicate offense is timely, that is enough - but while that is the only 
consistent explanation to distinguish this case from Kay, it is a distinction without a 
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meaningful difference. The statute either defines "unlawful activity" as conduct that can 
"constitute" an offense, and the statute of limitations is relevant, or the definition of 
"unlawful activity" and "constitute[ing] an offense" is separate and apart from statute of 
limitations concerns. The statute does not offer a different definition for different 
predicate acts. This is the problem with confusing the issue of UPUA being a continuing 
offense generally, and ignoring the definition of unlawful activity for predicate episodes.7 
III. There is No Merit to the State's Other Arguments. 
Once the plain language application of the UPUA is made, there is no basis to 
further "interpret" the Act. In addition, the application of existing law makes clear that 
the district court's decision was valid. Nevertheless, Mr. Stewart here addresses the 
remaining arguments advanced by the State, none of which are availing. 
A. The Nature of Limitations Statutes 
The State argues that the district court and Mr. Stewart "misapprehend" the 
"nature" of limitations statutes. Respectfully, as argued above, the State misapprehends 
that when a statute of limitations is at issue, Mr. Stewart has the right not to be accused of 
the time-barred conduct - in any form, and such conduct cannot and does not constitute 
an offense under Utah law. 
Secondarily, the authority cited by the State all deals with inapposite 
circumstances where defendants seek to exclude evidence from periods of time that fall 
7 Further, this Court in Kay also referenced Utah R. Crim. P. 25(d) ("An order of dismissal ... 
based upon the statute of limitations [] shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the offense 
charged."). This is consistent with Mr. Stewart's argument, the district court's application of 
Kay, and the Kay decisions implicit reliance upon statute of limitations law as consequently 
invalidating previously dismissed predicate charges. 
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outside limitations period, but that could be otherwise used to prove timely alleged 
elements of relevant charges. That is not the case here. The exclusion of evidence here 
took place because the evidence sought to be introduced was for an invalid legal purpose 
- i.e. to prove a predicate act, or to prove certain conduct was "unlawful activity" when it 
simply, could not be, as explained above. The State nowhere argues that there was any 
other purpose for the admission of the evidence - it was not going to prove any other 
count, and it was not going to prove any other element of the UPUA count. 
Third, the "nature" of the statute of limitations is decidedly about excluding 
evidence. The State argument presents a scenario of two ships passing in the night - not 
ever contacting each other. See e.g. Horton v. Goldmine r's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 
1091 (Utah 1989)("In general, statutes of limitation are intended to ... suppress stale and 
fraudulent claims so that claims are advanced while evidence to rebut them is still 
fresh."); Galetka, 965 P.2d at 572 (Recognizing "the purpose of a criminal statutes of 
limitation is avoiding the filing of stale criminal charges ... [ and] ... to foreclose the 
potential for inaccuracy and fairness that stale evidence and dull memories may occasion 
an unduly delayed trial.") (Internal quotes and citations omitted.) 
Fourth, "[t]he factual findings underlying a trial court's decision" to exclude or 
suppress evidence is "reviewed under the deferential clearly-erroneous standard" and 
then secondarily, "the legal conclusions" of the trial court involved in that exclusion, "are 
reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). The State makes no argument that excluding this evidence, under 
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the legal principle relied upon by the district court is, as applied to this circumstance, 
independently somehow, inappropriate. 
B. The Application of Federal RI CO Cases. 
It is true that the general similarity between the federal racketeering statute and the 
UPUA has meant that Utah appellate courts "look to ... federal case law for guidance on 
these issues." State v. Hutchings, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah App. 1997). But, by skipping 
the language of the UPUA that is at issue in this appeal, the State's brief overstate's the 
value of such federal law. 
First, the federal statute does not use the "constitute an offense" language 
discussed here. Instead, it uses the terms "chargeable" and "indictable." While there is 
some overlap, clearly the district court here used the term "chargeable" as an examination 
for what could constitute an offense - this Court has to "assume[] that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly" and "thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a 
reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy 
Clinic, Inc., 890 P.2d at 1020. As explained above, the use of the phrase "constitute an 
offense" in the Utah statute, is a marked distinction with direct consequence on the 
application of the term "unlawful activity" (Utah 1995). Further, federal courts have 
recognized the "anomalistic results" in federal law with the use of "chargable" and 
"indictable" as opposed the language used by the Utah statute. See e.g. Spinelli, 
Kehiayan-Berkman, S.A. v. /mas Gruner, A.I.A., & Assocs., 602 F. Supp. 372, 377 (D. 
Md. 1985). Other federal courts continue to recognize that the legal "validity" of 
"predicate offenses" in a racketeering charge is a legitimate attack, as discussed with 
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regard to McGrath, supra. See e.g. United States v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318, 1329 (3d 
Cir. l 993)(Emphasis added.) 
Finally, the line of federal cases that reject the application of statute of limitations 
arguments to predicate offenses, and further rejects the argument regarding whether a 
"chargeable" or "indictable" offense is determined at the time of the alleged act or at the 
time of the alleged charge, rests primarily on principles of federalism, not allowing state 
limitations periods to overrule the federal legislature's prerogative. See e.g. United States 
v. Mazzio, 501 F. Supp. 340, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff d, 681 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1982). 
That is clearly not the situation here. And, as argued above, the federal law is 
interpreting different language, and the Court must presume that Utah changed its 
language and used different terms, advisedly. Consider, the United States Supreme Court 
recently explained that, "RICO defines as racketeering activity only acts that are 
"indictable" ( or, what amounts to the same thing, "chargeable" or "punishable")", and 
clarifies that even under federal law if the "conduct" is not "indictable" it "cannot qualify 
as a predicate under RICO's plain terms." RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. 
Ct. 2090, 2102, 195 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2016). In Utah, based upon the Crank and related 
authority above, by Utah's use of the phrase "constitute an offense" rather than 
"indictable" or "chargeable" the consequent analysis is that time-barred offenses "cannot 
qualify as a predicate" under the plain terms of the UPUA. 
Thus, where there is Utah law on point, and where prior decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court support Mr. Stewart and the district court's reading of the statute - these 
authorities are not binding or helpful. 
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C. The Supposed Meaninglessness Implied by the Court's Decision 
The State argues that the consequence of the district court's application of statute 
of limitation restrictions on predicate offenses under the UPUA renders the other 
provisions of the act, "meaningless." Appellant's Br. at I 6-18. But, the opposite is true. 
First, the State cites no legal authority directly on point. 
Second, the State cites no authority for its argument that the July 31, 1981 
lookback period takes the place of statute of limitation analysis for what could constitute 
an offense under the "unlawful activity" definition. 
Third, the State's argument is that regardless of how long back it stretches a series 
of predicate acts, as long as one predicate act is within the limitations period for that act 
(why this would be relevant or implied from the text of the statute, the State never argues 
or explains), and so long as the "second-to-last" predicate offense occurs within the five 
year proximity requirement at § 76-10-1602(2), regardless of the other "statute of 
limitations for the older offenses, they are properly within the pattern statute." 
Appellant's Br. at 18. The State also argues that the "penultimate" predicate act also 
must occur within "five years of the last act." There is no textual reference or 
explanation for this last interpretation either. But, the consequence of this interpretation 
is both unexplainable and impermissible. Under the State's reading, not only would the 
Court be required to abandon the clear consequence of untimely predicate offenses 
referenced in Kay, but the State would be permitted to chain together an unlimited line of 
predicate acts - back 36 years to 1981. There is absolutely no support for such a result -
in the relevant caselaw, nor is this, for any reason, a better reading of the plain language 
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of the statute . Instead, it requires the court to add terms not contemplated by the 
legislature, and ignore the meaning of "constitute an offense" and the related, and 
established legal doctrines related to the statute of limitations protecting defendants from 
stale charges, stale evidence, and even the allegations of time-barred conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on May 22, 2017. 
/s/ ~ 
J.M~ 
Attorney for Appellee 
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